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ABSTRACT 
 
We develop a model of hedge fund returns, which reflect the contractual relationships 
between a hedge fund, its investors and its prime brokers. These relationships are 
modelled as short option positions held by the hedge fund, wherein the “funding 
option” reflects the short option position with prime brokers and the “redemption 
option” reflects the short option position with the investors. Given an alpha producing 
human capital, the hedge fund’s ability to deploy leverage to magnify its alpha is 
shown to be sharply constrained by the presence of these short options, which have a 
high probability of being exercised in “bad states” of the world, either due to poor 
performance or due to macroeconomic developments that are performance-
independent. We show that the hedge funds typically have an optimal level of 
leverage that trades off rationally the ability to increase alpha with the risk of early 
exercise of short options, which may precipitate the liquidation of the fund. Optimal 
leverage is shown to differ across hedge funds reflecting their de-levering costs, 
Sharpe ratios, correlation of assets, secondary market liquidity of their assets, and the 
volatility of the assets. Using a minimum level of unencumbered cash level as a risk 
limit, we show how a hedge fund can optimally choose aggregate risk capital and then 
allocate its risk capital across different risk-taking units to maximize alpha in the 
presence of these short option positions. Implications of our analysis for hedge fund 
investors and policy makers are summarized. Our framework can be easily modified 
to study portfolio selection problem facing any fund, which has granted redemption 
rights to its investors (money market funds, long-only funds, etc). 
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1. Introduction and Overview 
 
Risk management issues relating to Hedge funds, which received increased 
scrutiny following the collapse of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, 
have once again been receiving renewed attention following the onset of credit crisis 
in mid-2007. This increased focus on risk management of hedge funds has arisen from 
two considerations: first, hedge funds themselves have come to more fully appreciate 
the risks associated with funding by prime brokers and investor redemptions. Second, 
the fact that hedge funds are counterparties to prime brokers, who are often 
international banks engaged in corporate and consumer lending has raised the spectre 
of propagation of systemic risk through hedge funds. The potential for hedge funds to 
transmit systemic risk (through their deleveraging processes) to the banking system 
has become a matter of concern as evidenced by Kambhu, Schuermann, and Stiroh 
(2007), Hildebrand (2007), Lo (2008) and Papademos (2007). President’s working 
group (1999) has also emphasized this aspect.  
 
In 2008 alone a record number of hedge funds have failed and the market 
positions of the hedge funds industry have shrunk dramatically. Lo (2008) reports that 
the estimated assets in the hedge fund industry grew from $38 billion in 1990 to $1.87 
trillion in 2007. The estimated assets in the last quarter of 2008 stood at $1.60 trillion. 
The market positions of hedge funds fell from $5.23 trillion in 2007 to $3.68 trillion 
as of the last quarter of 2008. This drop in market positions amounting to a little over 
$1.5 trillion is the reduction in the overall leverage in the hedge fund industry, which 
is a result of extensive voluntary and involuntary deleveraging undertaken by many 
hedge funds. 
Several important risk management lessons have emerged from the manner in 
which the credit crisis has impacted the hedge fund business. Two of these deserve 
special mention and form the focus of our study. First, hedge funds have realized that 
the prime brokers and counterparties3 can either significantly increase margin 
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3 
requirements and/or potentially withdraw their credit lines in periods of crisis. Such 
actions dramatically increase the funding costs of hedge funds and in some cases 
impair their ability to maintain (potentially profitable) risky positions. This risk then 
forces hedge funds to de-lever in bad states of the world thereby imposing losses, and 
threatening their survival. Second, hedge fund investors, who become liquidity-
constrained as a result of the credit crisis, tend to withdraw their capital under 
precisely the same circumstances thereby increasing the risk of large-scale 
redemptions. These two sources of risk may be relevant even to a hedge fund that has 
been performing well by any benchmark of performance prior to the onset of (or even 
during) the credit crisis.  
 
1.1 Funding and Redemption Options: 
 
We can think of these two risk factors in options parlance as the hedge fund being 
short in two types of very valuable options:  
 
The ability and the willingness of prime brokers to withdraw credit lines in bad 
states of the world is equivalent to the hedge fund being short an option to reduce 
leverage in bad states of the world. By virtue of this short option position, the fund 
agrees or commits to reduce leverage in bad states of the world.  
 
The willingness of investors to redeem their partnership shares in bad states of the 
world is equivalent to the hedge fund being short in redemption option, which obliges 
the fund to agree to provide its investors liquidity precisely when it is needed most for 
the fund to protect its continuing investors and enhance its chances of survival. 
 
We will refer to the option held by the prime brokers as “funding option” and the 
option held by the investors as “redemption option”.  Figure 1 highlights the nature of 
these contractual agreements that a typical hedge fund will have with its funding 
counterparties (PBs) and its investors. To focus attention on our principal questions, 
we abstract from other contractual issues, including the performance and management 
fees that the fund manager negotiates with investors. 
 
Figure 1 
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These options operate through different channels. The funding options sold to 
prime brokers are exercised through increased margins and/or reduced credit lines in 
bad states of the world, which can lead to involuntary deleveraging if the fund has not 
placed risk limits anticipating such a possibility. Table 1 illustrates vividly the manner 
in which the “haircuts” were increased against different classes of collateral in August 
2008. In the case of certain asset classes such as CDOs, prime brokers simply refused 
to accept them. In such instances as well as in those where the margin got multiplied 
by a factor of more than 10 (as in ABS in Table 1, for example), hedge funds found 
themselves in need of de-levering, often involuntarily.  
Table 1  
Typical “Haircut” or initial margin 
In percent4 
Collateral April 2007 August 2008 
U.S. Treasuries 0.25 3 
Investment-grade bonds 0-3 8-12 
High-yield bonds 10-15 25-40 
Equities 15 20 
Investment grade corporate 
CDS 
1 5 
Senior leveraged loans 10-12 15-20 
Mezzanine leveraged loans 18-25 35+ 
 AAA 2-4 95 
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AA 4-7 95 
A 8-15 95 
BBB 10-20 95 
 
ABS CDO:  
Equity 50 100 
AAA CLO 4 10-20 
Prime MBS 2-4 10-20 
ABS 3-5 50-60 
 
If the cost of involuntary deleveraging is very high, the funds may find themselves 
in a downward spiral threatening their survival. Moreover, prime brokers may also 
specify a NAV (net asset value) trigger for periodic (yearly, for example) declines 
below which they may terminate funding5. The funding option is especially potent, 
given the fact that most hedge funds (unlike banks) do not have access to equity or 
other capital markets for financing. Unlike banks, hedge funds cannot count on central 
bank facilities for emergency funding either. 
On the other hand, the redemption options operate via reduction of assets under 
management (AUM) which can lead to some or all risk limits to become binding. A 
flurry of major redemptions or draw-downs may cause the hedge fund to breach the 
NAV trigger with its prime brokers. A deluge of redemptions forces the hedge fund 
into involuntary deleveraging, with significant impact on realized returns for both 
exiting and remaining investors. Despite the presence of gates, lockup periods, and 
notice periods, the hedge fund industry returned nearly $400 billion of capital in 2008 
to meet the requests for redemptions by investors6. Figure 2 below estimates the 
redemptions at close to $300 billion. Note that in the year 2008, both poor 
performance and investor redemptions contributed to the massive declines in assets 
under management.  
 
Figure 27 
Net asset flows to hedge funds 
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 The NAV trigger tends to be much lower than investor’s redemption trigger and is less likely to be 
normally activated than investor’s redemption trigger. 
6
 “Hedge Fund Liquidations”, New York Law Journal, March 2, 2009. 
7
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Since both options are likely to be triggered in the states of world where the cost 
of deleveraging is high, they can have a significant impact on the hedge fund 
performance. It follows that a proper evaluation of the expected hedge fund return 
should take into account of the likelihood that these options may be triggered and the 
likely impact on the fund’s performance in the event that they are triggered. One of 
the main points that we wish to get across (to be elaborated in much greater detail 
later) is the fact that the expected return of a hedge fund, as well as the associated 
risk, depends not only on the ex ante evaluation of the hedge fund portfolio strategies 
per se, but also on how effectively the hedge fund manages the funding and 
redemption options. 
 
Prudent risk management practice at hedge funds requires first and foremost that 
these options are formally recognized and correctly understood by the managers, 
transparently communicated to all relevant counterparties, properly priced ex-ante, 
and actively managed ex-post. The fact that a hedge fund is short in these options 
informs on the level of leverage and unencumbered cash levels it should deploy under 
normal circumstances and how it should manage them over time as states of the world 
move from “normal states” to “abnormal states”8. Finally, since these options tend to 
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get exercised in bad states of the world, worst case losses must be estimated through 
appropriate stress scenario analysis, and incorporated ex ante in risk budgeting9. Our 
paper will focus on these important dimensions of risk management.  
 
Hedge funds with good risk management practices attempt to deal with the 
“funding option” by having an ongoing and healthy (i.e., open and transparent) 
relationship with multiple prime brokers, and through these relationships building 
ample excess capacity in available credit lines. The availability of excess funding 
capacity effectively makes the funding option farther out of the money, which in turn 
provides reassurances to credit committees of relevant prime brokers. Having multiple 
prime brokers not only reduces the chance that the funding option will be exercised (it 
is much less likely that multiple prime brokers will pull credit lines at the same time – 
unless it is performance driven in which case all bets are off), but also diversifies and 
therefore reduces counterparty risk.10 An “ever-green” facility is clearly desirable, but 
the price is usually prohibitive. 
 
The “redemption option” held by the investors is usually dealt with through 
carefully articulated and investor-approved contractual provisions such as a 
reasonably long redemption cycle (say quarterly) and with a reasonable notification 
period (say 45 to 90 days),  lock-up periods (can be hard or soft), early redemption 
penalties, investor-level or fund-level gates, etc. These contractual provisions are 
typically proposed to the investors and approved by the investors, ex-ante, so that all 
investors understand that liquidity in bad states of the world may only come at a price 
(effectively paid to those investors who are more patient and providing better liquidity 
to the fund). In designing such contracts, hedge funds must protect the interests of 
“long-term” investors, but agree to provide liquidity to “short-term” investors in bad 
states at a fair price. Designing different share classes is yet another way to address 
this short option position. Avoiding the co-mingled positions by short-term and long-
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 Normally stress tests tend to focus on extreme scenarios of market and counterparty credit risk. Such 
scenarios may also trigger the funding and redemption options. Unanticipated surges in future 
volatilities are not easy to model, and hence stress-scenario analysis are a way in which one can get a 
better understanding of how the potential exercise of these options should limit current risk-taking.  
10
 Hildebrand (2007) argues for the need of the prime broker to have a “complete risk metric” of each 
hedge fund that the prime broker is exposed to. In fact he argues that the prime broker should be aware 
of the margining terms agreed by their hedge fund clients with other counterparties and clients. 
Hildebrand ignores the potential for prime brokers to engage in predatory behaviour. 
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term investors through contractual provisions helps to manage the liquidity profile 
better. The generation of alpha might require a minimum investment time horizon, 
and hence there is a need to match this time horizon with the desire of the investors to 
have access to liquidity at frequent intervals. One of the purposes of the contractual 
provisions discussed is to try and minimize the gap between investment time horizon 
and the redemption cycles desired by investors. 
While the ex-ante pricing of these two options is a topic of independent interest, 
the main thrust of our paper is the manner in which these options influence optimal 
leverage, risk budgeting, and the active management of hedge fund risk. We examine 
the questions primarily from the perspective of a hedge fund risk manager. The 
framework, however, should be of interest to hedge fund investors and regulators of 
financial markets for reasons that we discuss later in the paper.   
 
1.2 Placing the paper in the hedge fund literature 
 
Academic research on hedge funds is extensive. Lo (2008) in his written testimony to 
the United States Congress provides a detailed treatment of hedge funds in terms of 
their potential contribution to exacerbating systemic risk in the economy11. Our 
paper’s contribution in this context is to show that funds may use conservative levels 
of leverage if they properly recognize the short option positions that are implied by 
their contractual arrangements with investors and prime brokers. The current crisis 
might have served to sharpen their focus on these options. One strand of literature has 
been focussed on the presence of nonlinearities in hedge fund returns. Some of the 
papers that have addressed this question include, Fung and Hsieh (1997a), Agarwal 
and Naik (2004), and Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004). Cheny, Getmansky, Shane and 
Lo (2005) proposes a specification in which there can be “phase-locking” behaviour 
in hedge fund returns, when with a small probability all hedge fund returns become 
exposed to common market-wide factors. Our paper identifies important sources of 
nonlinearities that are inherent in the way in which hedge funds contract with their 
investors and their funding counterparties. This is very distinct from the nonlinearities 
that arise from the portfolio strategies followed by hedge funds, which has been the 
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pertaining to hedge funds. 
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focus of these papers12. In fact, our paper suggests that nonlinearities can arise in 
hedge fund returns, due to the rational behaviour of hedge funds in managing their 
short option positions even if their portfolio strategies did not involve option-like 
positions. Another strand of literature has examined the presence of survivorship bias, 
selection bias, and back-filling bias in hedge funds databases. They include papers by 
Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Ross (1992, 1997), Fung and Hsieh (1997b, 2000), 
and Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999). This is an important empirical question 
and does not pertain directly to our paper. The role of managerial contracts, high-
water marks, lockups and gates have been addressed by Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and 
Ross (2003), Stavros, and Westerfield (2009), Brown, Goetzmann, Park (2001). Such 
performance contracts and high water marks may induce the hedge fund to alter 
endogenously its risk-taking behaviour13. Brown, Goetzmann, Park (2001) argue that 
career concerns may moderate excessive risk-taking even in the presence of such 
contracts. Ang and Bollen (2009) have examined the role of lockups assuming 
exogenous arrival rates of failures. The presence of lockups and gates will serve to 
lower the value of redemption options, cetaris paribus. Aragon (2004) uses monthly 
data to document a positive, concave relationship between a fund’s excess returns and 
its redemption notice period and minimum investment size. Hombert and Thesmar 
(2009) show empirically that funds with lockups outperform funds with no lockups, 
conditional on past bad performance. We can, in principle, model the gates and 
lockups by treating the redemption option as Bermudian, with restricted set of 
exercise dates and restricted sequential exercise. In our model, there is a parameter 
that allows us to examine the role of gates on hedge fund risk-return trade-offs: in the 
presence of gates, AUM grows relatively faster, on average, and the manager can use 
the unencumbered cash (which is a fraction of the AUM) as a risk management tool to 
choose the optimal leverage level. This in turn will determine endogenously the 
likelihood of liquidation. The relationship between gates and optimal leverage will be 
examined in the paper. Duffie, Wang and Wang (2008) come closest to the spirit of 
our paper in that they study the optimal use of leverage by a fund which trades off the 
costs of adjusting leverage with expected benefits as captured by the present values of 
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 Astute hedge funds often incorporate “macro-hedging” strategies, which often involve long positions 
in option-like instruments such as credit default swaps. Such long positions have the effect of at least 
partially offsetting the inherent short positions held by the hedge fund. A macro credit crisis that has 
the effect of pushing funding option in the money will also increase CDS spreads, for example. 
13
 Such potential endogenous changes in risk-taking will be relevant to the questions that we address. 
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the fees earned. Their paper focuses on conditions under which a constant proportion 
of assets under management are an incentive compatible fee structure and examines 
the implications of regulations on leverage. In contrast, our paper focuses on how 
short option positions held by prime brokers and investors influence the leverage 
decision and the allocation of risk capital across different units within a hedge fund. 
 
 1.2 Roadmap and a summary of results 
      In section 2 of the paper, we will lay out a hedge fund model which characterizes 
the short options with prime brokers and investors and study the interplay between 
leverage and these options. Section 2 also motivates the role of unencumbered cash 
level in managing the insolvency risk, and how that enters into the hedge fund returns 
process through the options held by the prime brokers against the hedge fund. Our 
model will highlight some key elements of a sound risk management and operational 
framework, including how to set appropriate risk limits taking into account of such 
optionality. This section also details the link between counterparty exposure, 
margining efficiency and unencumbered cash levels. Section 3 works out the optimal 
leverage (risk capital) that a hedge fund should employ in order to maximize alpha14. 
This optimization problem facing the hedge fund explicitly accounts for short option 
position arising from its contractual commitments. Section 4 uses the framework 
developed in section 2 and the results in section 3 to characterize the risk budgeting 
problem when a central planner (the risk manager of the fund) assigns risk capital to 
many risk-taking units within a hedge fund by maximizing the overall fund alpha 
subject to a) short option positions, and b) aggregate risk constraints specified through 
a restriction on the minimum level of unencumbered cash that the fund must always 
hold to mitigate the risk of insolvency. Section 5 outlines some implications for hedge 
fund investors and policy makers. Section 6 concludes. 
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 Risk capital is defined as the sum of all volatility adjusted leverage ratios )*('1 ttL σ , where tL is 
the vector of leverage ratios is employed by risk-taking units, tσ is the vector of volatilities of assets 
used in the strategy and 1 is the (Nx1) vector of unities. We denote by the quantity ')*( ttL σ the 1xN 
vector [ ]NNLLL σσσ ,......., 2211 . 
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Our main results cut to two important questions. First, we show that the hedge fund as 
a whole has an interior optimal level of aggregate risk capital, which is derived as 
follows. For each level of aggregate risk capital, which in the context of our model is 
the dot product of leverage and volatility of all risk-taking units, we maximize the 
overall alpha of the fund to determine the risk-capital allocation. As the aggregate 
risk-capital level increases from zero, the optimal alpha increases until the effects of 
the short option positions drive the optimal alpha down. This allows us to uniquely 
identify the optimal level of aggregate risk-capital. Second, we show that each risk-
taking unit will get a finite risk budget, which reflects the shadow cost of the 
aggregate constraint on unencumbered cash and the presence of short options15. In 
particular, it is no longer the case that the relationship between the excess return and 
risk is linear. This is due to the fact that at high enough leverage and volatility the 
short options go deep in the money and recognizing this, the desks are allocated less 
risk capital, ex-ante. After characterizing these results, we show how the Sharpe ratios 
of each risk-taking unit, the correlation of excess returns across risk-taking units, short 
option positions, and the deleveraging costs associated with meeting unencumbered 
cash levels influence the allocation of risk capital. 
 
2. A Simple Model of Hedge Fund Returns 
 
To lay the ground work, we consider a generic return generating process in the 
absence of any leverage: 
 
11 ++ += ttttR εσα  
(1) 
This return generating process assumes a “market-neutral” stance so that there are no 
market-wide risk factors that are part of the return generating process.16 We can 
therefore interpret tα as the excess return that can be earned by the hedge fund in the 
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 Even in the absence of an aggregate constraint on unencumbered cash, the risk capital allotted to 
each risk-taking unit is finite due to short option positions and de-levering costs. 
16
 For ease of exposition, the return generating process abstract away from specific details of different  
styles in hedge fund strategy, such as the conditional directionality of a macro strategy or a CTA 
strategy. Such extensions should be immediate but distract away from the central themes. We also 
assume that this alpha generating process is fully scalable. 
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absence of any leverage17 (or a real-money investor for that matter). To make the 
problem non-trivial, we can assume that tt s σα ×= , where the Sharpe ratio s > 0 so 
that it can be properly considered as a pure “alpha” strategy. The ability to identify 
such investment opportunities is the pre-requisite of a good hedge fund manager.18 
 
We take for granted that the manner in which a hedge fund deploys the alpha strategy 
for investors will necessarily involve some degree of leverage. This is because in its 
pure form, an alpha strategy is “cash-neutral” or “self-financing”. The “native” level 
of leverage, conventionally defined as the notional size of the risky position divided 
by the initial cash outlay, is not infinite only because, in practice, a hedge fund must 
post initial margin to its PBs (more generally any clearing and/or trading 
counterparties) in order to mitigate its credit exposure to the PBs19. The overall 
leverage level of a hedge fund (henceforth tL , defined as the notional size of the risky 
position as a multiple of the AUM) will be lower if the risk margin posted is only a 
small portion of the overall AUM.  
 
The presence of the funding and redemption options means that, in general, the 
expected hedge fund return may be linear in tL  only if  tL  is sufficiently low. 
Heuristically, the higher is the leverage, the more volatile is the levered return, and 
the more likely that the funding and redemption options are in the money. Since the 
hedge fund is short the options, its expected return will be negatively affected by the 
expected impact (in the form of expected deleveraging costs) in the event that one or 
both options are exercised. At sufficiently (or excessively) high leverage levels, the 
nonlinearity associated with the funding and redemption options can indeed dominate.  
We formalize this intuition in section 3. It is clear that given any alpha strategy, a 
hedge fund deploying such a strategy can be either a good or a bad proposition for 
investors. It can be a good proposition if the leverage level is appropriate. It can be a 
bad proposition if the leverage level is excessive. Is there such a thing as an “optimal 
leverage level”? How can the leverage level be objectively measured, judiciously 
                                                 
17
 We can allow σ to change over time. 
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 Our paper therefore does not speak to hedge fund managers who generate return either by leveraging 
beta or by writing options.  
19
 In addition, the fund may set aside additional cash to meet variation margin calls resulting from daily 
marking to market. 
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managed, and clearly communicated? What is the manner in which the overall risk-
capital should be allocated across different risk-taking units within a fund? We will 
address these questions below.   
 
To formally address these questions, we consider a hedge fund manager who aims at 
deploying the strategy characterized by (1) cognizant of the fund’s short option 
positions with PBs and investors. At the outset, the hedge fund has set out some 
contractual terms so that effectively its investors have the option to redeem a fraction 
ϕ−e of the AUM whenever the annualized return drops below a “redemption 
trigger” R 20. Furthermore, the hedge fund has entered contractual terms with its prime 
brokers whereby the prime brokers have the option to withdraw the funding required 
to support the leverage level whenever the annualized return drops below a “funding 
trigger” PB 21.  
Based on our discussions earlier, and industry experience, it is reasonable to assume 
that PBR < . For simplicity, we will treat these triggers as being exogenous and 
solely determined by the performance of the fund. It should be clear that the triggers 
depend on contractual terms: for example, we may expect that R will tend to be 
higher with gates than without. 
 
The first option can be captured by specifying how the number of shares tN in the 
fund evolves over time:  
{ }
.
11
1
RtRtLeNN tt
<+×
−
+ =
ϕ
 
(2) 
Where for simplicity we assume that there is no subscription or redemption other than 
possible redemptions in the event of extremely negative performance. We use the 
indicator functions (defined as 11 =A  if A is true and 0 otherwise) to represent the 
redemption options held by investors.  
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 We will assume that .0<R  
21
 We will assume that .0<PB  
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Note that the parameter ϕ may be interpreted as representing the “gate”: if 0=ϕ , 
then the shares cannot be redeemed even after poor performance. On the other hand 
as ∞→ϕ , the shares can be fully redeemed following poor performance, and the 
hedge fund essentially will have to liquidate following a period of poor performance22.  
 
The second option can be captured by specifying how the margin requirement 
demanded by PBs evolves over time:  
 
{ }PBtRtLett
<+×
=+
11
1
ηλλ    
(3) 
Where tλ is the “margin multiplier” or the amount by which margins may be 
increased by the PBs following a poor performance. The concept of margin multiplier 
reflects three economic considerations.  
 
First, it contains the notion of a “credit multiplier” that each PB assigns to the hedge 
fund as part of the margin agreement. To the extent that the hedge fund is perceived 
as a prudent risk taker and therefore a safer credit, the PBs can agree to a lower credit 
multiplier. This component may be attributed to the informational differences 
between the fund and its PBs. 
 
Second, if the hedge fund has multiple PBs, its positions are likely to be distributed 
across different PBs and therefore there is a loss of margin efficiency in that risk 
across PBs can not be netted. The aggregate risk perceived by each of the PBs will 
therefore be higher than the portfolio risk (namely )*(1' ttL σ ). As a result, tλ will 
typically be much higher than the credit multiplier that each PB assigns to the hedge 
fund. 
 
Finally, the margin requirement by each individual PB is almost always linked to the 
market (systematic) risk exposure of the positions held at the PB. To the extent that 
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 It is relatively straightforward to model redemption option exercise which may be non-performance 
related. For example, we could specify { }.1
1
1
CtCDSeNN tt
>+
−
+ =
ϕ
 In this case, when the CDS spreads of 
(say) financial services index exceeds a high enough threshold level, hedge fund investors begin to 
redeem: this is not unlike the redemptions that happened during the credit crisis. 
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the hedge fund does not have systematic risk exposure but have such exposure with 
individual PBs, there is inefficiency: the hedge fund is paying extra margin (in fact 
twice) for risk exposures that are offset between two PBs. Therefore, it is meaningful 
to talk about the “optimality” of tλ : the optimal margin multiplier is one when the 
hedge fund has no systematic risk exposure to each individual PB.23 
 
When the funding trigger is breached, the PBs can increase the margin requirement by 
a factor of ηe . The dollar amount of the margin requirement is assumed to be a risk 
measure such as VaR (effectively the levered volatility) multiplied by tλ . This 
becomes clear if we assume that, by contractual agreement, the total margin 
requirement is simply tttt AUML σλ . Note that the parameter η may be loosely 
interpreted as representing the “funding friendliness”: if 0=η , then the margin 
multiplier remains the same even after poor performance, capturing low risk premium 
in credit markets. On the other hand as ∞→η , the funding is effectively withdrawn 
following poor performance, capturing extreme risk aversion in credit markets. In 
other words, tttt AUML σλ captures the willingness or the ability of banking sector to 
extend credit lines and is a measure of the stage in credit cycles. Higher the leverage, 
higher the volatility of assets, and higher is the margin multiplier, then greater will be 
the margin demanded of the hedge funds by the banking sector. It should therefore be 
clear that PB  is likely to decrease with increases in volatility and credit spreads.  
 
2.1 Unencumbered Cash 
 
At this juncture, it is useful to introduce the notion of “unencumbered cash level” 
denoted by tU , which is simply the fraction of AUM not posted as margin. This 
concept is closely related to the funding option.  
 
Thus,  
tttt Lu σλ−=1 . 
                                                 
23
 Clearly the margin multiplier is trivially optimized in this sense if a single PB is used. In reality, 
multiple PBs are preferred due to considerations of diversity of counterparty risk and funding capacity. 
The bankruptcy of Lehman and its prime broking division has also highlighted the need to have more 
than one prime broker for hedge funds. 
16 
(4) 
The “unencumbered cash” is defined as the portion of the investor asset under 
independent custodian (i.e., unencumbered by counterparty obligations). 
Mathematically, the unencumbered cash is simply the compliment of the margin 
posted with the counterparties. In order for this “surplus” portion of the cash to be 
completely unencumbered, however, it is important that a legal structure is put in 
place. The economic significance of the “unencumbered cash” is that this is the 
minimum amount that investors can get back if all counterparties were default on 
their obligations and all margin postings are lost (or nearly lost as the Lehman 
bankruptcy has demonstrated).  
 
In our view, the use of the unencumbered cash as a risk management tool has not been 
sufficiently emphasized. Indeed, we would argue that unencumbered cash is probably 
the most important risk management tool at the disposal of a hedge fund. There are 
several reasons why.  
 
First, even though hedge fund investors are, by self selection, comfortable with the 
lack of “principal protection”, a commitment to a high level of unencumbered cash is 
the best that a hedge fund manager can do in providing some form of “principal 
protection” and ought to give comfort to most hedge fund investors. With a 
sufficiently high level of “principal protection”, the value of “redemption option” can 
be significantly mitigated. 
 
Second, the unencumbered cash is not only a function of the portfolio risk perceived 
by the investment manager it is crucially also a function of the risk perceived by the 
counterparties. Since in most PB platforms the margin requirements are risk-based 
and margining terms are vigorously scrutinized and negotiated by both the hedge fund 
manager and the counterparties, the unencumbered cash gives a very objective 
measure of portfolio risk and there is usually a direct relationship with the amount of 
leverage that a hedge fund deploys.  
 
Third, to the extent that lack of operational efficiency, or the lack of informational 
accuracy, or the sub-optimality of counterparty exposure tend to reduce 
unencumbered cash levels, a risk management framework centred on unencumbered 
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cash provides a natural and measurable objective function for many crucial aspects of 
the operational platform of a hedge fund.  
The dynamic relationship between unencumbered cash and other key underlying 
variables are captured by equation (4). This simple specification suggests that there is 
an immediate response in unencumbered cash with changes in a) leverage, b) 
volatility of fund’s assets, c) the trajectory of assets under management from one 
period to the next, and d) the inefficiencies associated with the funding arrangements 
with the prime brokers24. A risk management framework anchored on unencumbered 
cash levels will therefore respond much more quickly to potential movements in the 
moneyness of the “funding” and “redemption” options than traditional measures such 
as VaR.25 
 
Note that the unencumbered cash level decreases with leverage as more risk capital 
must be allocated by the fund, reducing cash available. The unencumbered cash level 
is also decreasing in the volatility of fund’s return generating process. As the AUM 
decreases over time (either due to losses or due to withdrawals) the unencumbered 
cash level goes down. Finally, the parameter λ captures the inefficiency in funding 
arrangements due the ability and market conventions that the prime brokers use in 
setting funding parameters. Greater the inefficiency, higher will be the parameter 
λ and hence lower will be the unencumbered cash level. 
 
We illustrate below the manner in which unencumbered cash level evolve over time. 
Note that if the options are triggered, the un-encumbered cash will respond 
automatically: 
 
                                                 
24
 The inefficiencies come in several forms, some avoidable and some not. An unavoidable form of 
inefficiency is introduced when multiple prime brokers are used and therefore different legs of a tightly 
hedged position may scatter across different prime brokers. Avoidable inefficiencies are unnecessarily 
large market risk exposure with counterparties or unrealistic margin parameters imposed by 
counterparties.  
25
 In an ideal world with a single prime broker, there is a close relationship between unencumbered 
cash and VaR, since margin requirement is usually computed based on VaR and a so-called credit 
multiplier and latter is relatively static. The disadvantage of VaR compared to unencumbered cash are 
two fold: (1) it is ultimately a theoretical construct and model dependent; an internal VaR model is not 
as objective as a margin agreement even if the latter is also VaR based; (2) it abstracts away from the 
real-world inefficiencies (as captured by λ ) which can be a significant source of risk in the context of 
the “funding” and “redemption” options. 
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Where −+1tu is the unencumbered cash level before the hedge fund is is able to adjust 
the leverage ratio from tL  to 1+tL . One possible risk management policy (again for 
illustrative purposes) is to maintain the same level of unencumbered cash through 
time by dynamically changing the leverage ratio as follows. 
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That is, under the risk management policy that the unencumbered cash is kept at 
certain level, the leverage level needs to be adjusted down when (i) volatility 
increases; and/or (ii) the margin multiplier increases; and/or (iii) the AUM decreases. 
If the adjustment of the leverage level is voluntary and/or pre-emptive, the cost of 
deleveraging may be negligible. If the deleveraging is involuntary, triggered by the 
exercise of the funding and/or redemption options, the cost of deleveraging can be 
substantial, and in some cases devastating.  
The concept of a risk limit on unencumbered cash level will be integrated into the 
choice of optimal risk capital in section 4. 
 
2.2 Dynamics of NAV and AUM 
 
We can capture the dynamics of net asset value (NAV), or AUM per share, as follows:  
{ } { }PBtRtLtttRtRtLttttt LLbLLaRL
tt eNAVNAV <+×+<+×++
−×−−×−×
+ ×=
11111 1)(1)(
1
σσ
 
(5) 
Where the indicator functions represent the two options and the deleveraging costs 
associated with the triggering of the options are represented by the parameters “a” and 
“b”, respectively. We have taken for granted that the deleveraging costs tend to be 
higher if market volatility is higher. In general, b > a, as the asset sale after PB seizes 
control tends to be done at “fire-sale” prices, whereas de-leveraging in response to 
investor redemption can often be done at somewhat more orderly fashion and 
reasonable price levels, especially if the hedge fund is endowed with reasonable 
investor liquidity terms such as a reasonable notice period and a reasonable gate 
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policy. On the other hand, the trigger level for funding option tends to be much lower 
than the redemption trigger level. 
 
It follows from the identity ttt NAVNAUM ×=  that: 
 
{ } { }PBtRtLtttRtRtLttttt LLbLLaRL
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(6) 
 
Taking the logarithm of (5), we have:26 
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(7) 
Equation (7) immediately implies that, in general, the expected excess return of a 
hedge fund is less than the alpha of the underlying strategy multiplied by the leverage 
ratio. If the leverage ratio is too high, the funding and redemption options will have a 
significant probability of being exercised and the expected excess return can be 
negative. Excessively levered hedge funds can have a return profile similar to 
shorting options directly as part of its investment strategies.  
 
The second conclusion that can be drawn from the above equation is that leverage 
ratio is inherently a dynamic concept. What determines the moneyness of the options 
is the “levered volatility” ttL σ  relative to the trigger levels. It follows that the hedge 
fund should adjust the leverage ratio commensurate with the changing volatility. It 
also implies that different hedge funds deploying strategies with different volatilities 
should naturally have different leverage levels.  
 
Finally, it can be easily demonstrated that there is an “optimal” level of leverage ratio 
or risk capital, characterized by ),,,,(* ηϕσ basgL tt = , in the sense that at this level, 
the expected hedge fund return is maximized. One problem with adopting this as the 
                                                 
26
 We can interpret ae− can be properly interpreted as the “cost of deleveraging” (which may be 
partially offset by early-redemption penalty fees) in meeting redemption requests.  
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optimal leverage policy is that the implied unencumbered cash level tttt Lu σλ ** 1−=  
may be too low either due to an unanticipated surge in volatility or redemptions or 
both. In order to avoid premature liquidation by not having enough unencumbered 
cash, hedge funds may rationally choose optimal leverage by imposing the restriction 
that the unencumbered cash level may not fall below a chosen (lower) risk limit. The 
concept of optimal leverage is addressed in section 3 and the role of unencumbered 
cash in constraining the leverage further to enhance continued survival of the fund is 
analyzed in section 4. 
 
3. Optimal Level of Risk Capital (Leverage) 
 
We will derive in this section the optimal level of risk capital that the hedge fund will 
seek to deploy. Traditional approach to risk budgeting when the portfolio manager has 
no short option positions is to solve a volatility or VaR minimization problem subject 
to an expected return objective. In the new framework that we have proposed, it is 
necessary to solve an optimization problem in which the expected return is maximized 
subject to the fact that the short option positions may be exercised with a high 
probability when the risk capital (leverage) is high.  
 
In order to derive analytical results, we make the following simplifying assumptions. 
First, we consider a simple one period setting with two dates, used in mean-variance 
portfolio optimization models. We can regard the one period to be one year to aid 
intuition. The fund must choose its optimal risk capital at date 0, knowing that the 
short options may be exercised by either investors or prime brokers before date 1. The 
time-line of the model is shown in Figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3 
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In path 1, the levered returns reach the barrier (assumed to be -20%) before t = 1 and 
the option is exercised by investors leading to de-levering costs. In path 2, the fund 
produces positive returns and the options are left unexercised, and the fund reaches t 
= 1 without any redemptions. 
We rewrite the generic return generating process (1) to reflect that there are many 
portfolio managers (“risk-taking” units) each of whom has an alpha generating 
mechanism. It is by aggregating across all those processes that we get the overall 
return generating process for the hedge fund (excluding the short option positions) as 
shown below: 
 
11 ++ += tttt sR εσσ oo  
(8) 
The notation ∑
=
=
N
i
itit ss
1
σσo represents the element by element multiplication of two 
vectors s and tσ . In equation (8), we denote the vector of Sharpe ratios by s and the 
vector of volatilities by tσ . 
Given equation (8), the return generating process with the short option position when 
the managers employ their idiosyncratic leverage levels can be specified next. We 
first define the (Nx1) vector of risk capital as ttLx σ*≡ each element of which 
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contains the product of leverage and volatility of a risk-taking unit. Then the return 
generating process of the hedge fund may be written as follows. 
 
( ){ }'11
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1 RRLtt tt
xxaxsxh
≤++ +
−+=
o
ρε  
(9) 
 
The return process for the fund is obtained by aggregating across all risk-taking units, 
taking into account the following features: first, each risk-taking unit of the fund must 
be assigned some risk capital ( ttLx σ*≡ ) that they should deploy. Second, in making 
this decision, they must take into account the extent to which their decentralized risk 
capital deployment will increase/decrease the likelihood that the short position in the 
option will be exercised. Third, different risk-taking units may subject the firm to 
deleveraging costs if and when the short option position is exercised. This is reflected 
through the term xxa ρ' . This term shows that the contribution of all risk-taking units 
to the overall deleveraging costs of the firm is related to funding liquidity as measured 
by the leverage factor, the secondary market liquidity as measured by the volatility 
factor, and the macroeconomic circumstances as reflected by the parameter a and the 
correlation matrix ρ . In a period of aggregate liquidity shock, the parameter a will 
increase and ρ  tends to a diagonal matrix of unities. Finally, the cross-correlation 
benefits of different risk-taking units engaging in different (and hopefully less-
correlated) risk-taking activities under normal market conditions must be reflected in 
the decentralized decisions. 
 
The optimality problem can be presented in the classical portfolio optimization 
framework with the explicit recognition of the short option position as follows.  
Taking expectations of equation (9) we get,27 
 
                                                 
27
 In deriving Equation (10), we have made a few additional assumptions. First, we have assumed that 
tσ is constant. Second, we are treating Equation (1) as the discrete-time representation of a 
continuous-time return process and the option is triggered whenever the underlying continuous-time 
process breaches the trigger level for the first time within the next year. 
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(10) 
In equation (10) we denote by ( )•N  the normal distribution function28. Our approach 
to modelling hedge fund risk-return tradeoffs is captured by equation (10), which 
looks similar to the classic mean-variance portfolio optimization problem, except that 
the “implied risk aversion” itself is endogenous.  Equation (10) also reflects one of the 
key contributions of our paper: the short option position that is faced by fund 
managers is an explicit part of their optimization program. As such the term within 
the curly bracket in equation (10) reflects the probability of the levered returns hitting 
the barrier before date t = 129. Intuitively, we may think of the quantity inside the 
curly brackets of the second term as the value of a digital option that pays $1 if and 
when the realized returns of the fund breaches the barrier R the first time before date t 
= 1. Then the payoff of the digital is amplified by the deleveraging costs faced by the 
fund, which are assumed to be increasing in the risk-factor z and the parameter a. 
For the sake of simplicity, we will model just one option: the interpretation of our 
results will naturally depend on whether the option considered is the funding option or 
the redemption option. The combined treatment of both options is straightforward, 
and the qualitative results are likely to be similar to the ones that we report here30. 
 
It is useful to note the following properties of the objective function. First, note that 
the partial derivative with respect to the first variable ( yg ) is positive as shown 
below: 
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Next, the partial derivative with respect to the second variable ( zg ) is negative as 
shown next.  
                                                 
28
 We use the following notions, going forward: . and '' xxzsxy ρ==  
29
 This follows from the results presented in Harrison (1985). 
30
 One interesting interaction between the two options is the following. The exercise of redemption 
options may cause the funding option to go deeper in the money. This interaction is not studied in the 
paper. 
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These properties ensure that the risk-capital x has a finite optimal level. The optimal 
risk capital for unconstrained problem can be written as follows. 
s
g
g
x
z
y 1
2
−
−= ρ  
(11) 
 
Although we have squarely formulated the problem as one facing the hedge fund, and 
as one in which optimal allocation of risk-capital is the variable of interest, it is very 
easy to see the generality of our approach: consider for example, a “long-only” fund 
with no leverage. Namely, .1=L  
For this fund, investors may still have the option to redeem, and this short option is 
precisely the digital option represented in equation (10) with the modification that the 
option is now triggered by investors when there is either a flight to quality or when 
the fund posts sub-par performances relative to its peers over a threshold period of 
time. The choice variable facing such a long-only fund is obviously not the leverage 
(risk-capital) level, but its asset allocation and hence the choice of its beta, as equation 
(1) for the long-only fund will have a systematic (beta) component. The barrier level 
for the long-only fund is a threshold level of poor returns history. The formulation is 
therefore very general and can be applied to a broad range of optimal portfolio 
selection problems in which the funds are faced with varying degrees of short option 
positions with their investors. 
 
Substituting for yg  and zg in equation (11) and simplifying, we get the following 
closed-form expression for the optimal level of risk capital ( )'* ttt Lx σ= : 
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(12) 
Where (.)n is the normal density function. Equation (12) shows the optimal leverage 
employed by each risk taking unit. The relationship between the aggregate risk, z, and 
the underlying parameters is highly nonlinear.  
We can compute xxz 1' −= ρ using (12) to get the following expression for aggregate 
risk z. 
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(13) 
Note that (13) provides an explicit way to compute the aggregate risk, given the 
underlying contractual structure and the fund parameters: a) trigger level for the 
option, b) Sharpe ratios, c) correlations, and d) de-leveraging costs. We can combine 
(12) and (13) to get the risk-budget as follows. 
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(14) 
Given the aggregate risk capital z, we can determine the allocations independent of 
de-leveraging costs and option triggers. But the aggregate risk capital itself is 
endogenous and depends on these parameters as shown in (13). 
 
Note from figure 4 that the optimal aggregate risk capital is decreasing in the 
parameter a, which reflects the costs of de-leveraging due to the presence of short 
option positions. Thus the absolute level of risk capital (leverage) goes down as the 
de-leveraging costs associated with the short option positions increase.  This is 
illustrated in figure 4 for the case of two risk-taking units. We have assumed the 
following parameters: .1.1 and ,5.1,0%,10 21 ===−= ssR ρ  
Figure 4 
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This result has an important risk management message: hedge funds will be well 
advised to factor their contractual relationships with prime brokers and investors in 
determining their aggregate risk capital. 
 
3.1 Implied Risk Aversion and Distance to Default 
 
Equation (10) can be used to distinguish our formulation from the classic portfolio 
optimization problem. In the absence of any short options, hedge fund can allocate as 
much risk-capital as it wishes: such a strategy will increase the expected return of the 
portfolio without affecting the Sharpe ratio, assuming that the strategies are scalable. 
The presence of short options induces risk aversion as is clear from (10). This will in 
turn introduce a non-linearity in the relationship between expected returns and risk. 
To see this clearly, let us consider the mean-standard deviation optimization problem 
of a risk-averse hedge fund which maximizes the objective function shown below. 
 
zyg
2
λ
−=  
(15) 
 
Comparing (10) and (15), we can see that the risk-aversion arises from the costs 
associated with the potential exercise of short option positions. Note from equation 
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(14) that sszsxy 1'' −== ρ . This implies that ss
z
y 1' −
= ρ . For the funding option, 
we may regard the quantity DD
z
R
≡
||
 as essentially the distance to default or 
distance to liquidation. Given a set of Sharpe ratios, correlations, option triggers, and 
de-leveraging costs, the distance to default for the fund is endogenously chosen. This 
is seen by writing (13) as follows. 
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(16) 
This concept of distance to default is a convenient way to think about risk limits: the 
optimal distance to default that emerges from (16) could be used as a guideline by the 
risk managers to set more conservative distance to default to cover unanticipated 
surges in volatility or unforeseen changes in triggers by investors and prime brokers. 
This more conservative level may give the necessary cushion for the funds to perform 
voluntary de-leveraging in the face of an unanticipated crisis. This is best understood 
by recasting figure 4 in terms of distance to default as shown below. 
Figure 5 
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In Figure 5, note that the optimal distance to default is 0.45 when a = 4. One risk 
management policy might be to choose a more conservative level denoted by the 
dashed vertical line to the right of the unconstrained optimum. This choice sacrifices 
some expected returns. The precise location of the more conservative policy is 
dictated by the fund’s desired level of DD, which is a function of the amount of 
flexibility it wants to be able to perform voluntary de-levering when there is an 
unanticipated shock to volatility and/or funding conditions with PBs.  
Equation (16) places an important restriction on optimal risk-capital, and the implied 
distance to default for hedge funds. Given a distribution of Sharpe ratios (which 
capture the volatility of assets deployed by the fund and the correlation across 
different risk-taking units), and de-levering costs (which captures the secondary 
market liquidity of assets) the fund’s distance to default is pre-determined at the 
optimally chosen risk-capital. 
This is an important prediction: if the Sharpe ratios are the same for two funds, with 
one facing higher de-levering costs, then that fund must reduce its aggregate risk-
capital and increase its distance to default. This is presented in figure 6 below. 
Figure 6 
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Even if the fund negotiates a sufficiently low trigger level with investors and prime 
brokers, its endogenous (unconstrained) risk capital will leave the DD the same. 
Equation (16) also sets an upper bound on aggregate risk: the aggregate risk z upper 
bound that causes the distance to default to go to zero is at the point where 
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1' ass =−ρ  This is the point where the Sharpe ratio of the fund is exactly equal to 
the de-leveraging costs. 
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decreasing with the deleveraging cost a. This result arises from the fact that a fund 
with lower deleveraging cost for its short option positions as others will rationally 
choose a higher risk-capital. 
 
3.2 Risk capital allocation (unconstrained case) 
 
The behaviour of optimal risk capital with respect to other underlying parameters is 
easy to understand with two risk-taking units. They are illustrated below. 
First, we examine the relationship between the barrier levels, expected returns and the 
aggregate risk capital employed by the hedge fund. This is illustrated in figure 7 
below. 
Figure 7 
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Figure 7 shows that the aggregate risk increases if the trigger level is set sufficiently 
low – prime brokers are prepared to wait until the performance becomes really 
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intolerable. For example, if the trigger level is -10%, then the hedge fund can take a 
rather high level of risk at 21%. If the trigger is tightened to -2.5%, the aggregate risk 
reduced to 5.23%, which is a nearly a 4-fold reduction in risk. This result shows that a 
rational hedge fund will curtail its leverage in response to tightened market conditions 
for funding.  
 
In a similar fashion, we can investigate the effect of de-leveraging costs (as 
parameterized by a on endogenous leverage levels chosen by the hedge fund and its 
resulting expected returns. Figure 8 plots this relationship. 
 
Figure 8 
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Note the steep drop in risk capital, when the de-leveraging costs increase. Funds 
operating in illiquid secondary asset markets (such as structured credit) will naturally 
be careful about the level of leverage that they may wish to employ. 
Throughout this section we have analyzed the unconstrained choice of aggregate 
risk-capital by a hedge fund. In reality, hedge funds are concerned about the potential 
for liquidation due to unexpected surge in volatility, credit market dislocations, and 
large-scale investor redemptions. While the short options framework addresses some 
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of these concerns, prudent risk management may require explicit risk limits that 
further protect the hedge from insolvency by choosing a risk-capital which is below 
the unconstrained optimum that we have characterized in this section. 
 
4. Risk Budgeting 
 
We have shown that the optimal level of aggregate risk capital is smaller in the 
presence of short options positions. The relative risk capital defined as the ratio of 
risk capital employed across two risk taking units can be computed from (14) as 
follows for the case of two risk-taking units. Let us now denote by ρ simply the 
correlation coefficient between the risk capital of two risk-taking units. Then the ratio 
of risk capital is: 
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Equation (17) shows that the relative risk capital depends on both Sharpe ratios and 
the correlation coefficient. When the two risk-taking units are completely 
uncorrelated, then the relative risk capital is simply the ratio of Sharpe ratios. 
In the risk budgeting problem, the firm imposes a constraint on the aggregate risk 
limit on unencumbered cash, which bounds the amount of margin that can be used by 
the hedge fund in determining its overall leverage. As before, the expected return will 
also have the short option positions of the hedge fund. We will show that our 
formulation will enable us to exploit the powerful tools of traditional, mean-variance 
portfolio theory, notwithstanding the short option positions and the aggregate risk 
limit on unencumbered cash. We can now set up the optimization problem associated 
with the risk budgeting as follows. 
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32 
Equation (18) says that the individual risk-taking units are simultaneously choosing 
their risk-levels bearing in mind the shadow costs to the fund arising from the 
likelihood of the fund-level risk limits from becoming binding.  
We ended the preceding section by pointing out that the “optimal leverage ratio” 
derived from maximizing expected return may not be optimal after all if the implied 
unencumbered cash level is too low. A low unencumbered cash level is extremely 
dangerous for a hedge fund because an unexpected increase in margin requirement, an 
untimely redemption request, coupled with an untimely increase in market volatility 
can easily lead the hedge fund down the path of insolvency: its inability to meet 
margin calls puts itself at the mercy of a liquidation process where fire sale is the rule 
rather than the exception. To avoid such a fate, the hedge fund should adopt a policy 
that at no times the unencumbered cash should fall below an “insolvency” threshold 
or a more conservative thresholdu . Note that if both the funding and the redemption 
options are triggered, the unencumbered cash level will drop down to ( ) ηϕ++−− eut11 . 
Prudent risk management would call for the “stressed unencumbered cash level” to 
stay above the thresholdu . It follows that the optimal leverage ratio should be31: 
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The second term in the right hand of equation (19) captures three effects: (i) the 
higher is the unencumbered cash limit U , the lower is the optimal leverage level; (ii) 
if the investor base of the hedge fund has a higher propensity to redeem at bad news 
(i.e., higher ϕ ), or its PBs have a higher tendency to raise margin requirement (i.e., 
higher η ), the optimal leverage ratio should be lower; this can be viewed an 
allowance for “worst-case scenarios”; and (iii) the higher is the margin multiplier tλ , 
the lower the leverage ratio should be; this can be viewed as a penalty for “margin 
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 Note from equation (4a) (under the assumption that both options are exercised) that 
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want this level to be greater than the risk limit. Or, we want ueut ≥−−
++ ηϕ)1(1 . This in 
conjunction with the definition of unencumbered cash in equation (4) leads to equation (19). 
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inefficiency”. If the unencumbered cash level is chosen conservatively than the risk 
limit in (19) will be binding, and we get 
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(20) 
In equation (20), we represent the unconstrained optimal risk-capital level (found in 
section 3 earlier) as .*v This is an important restriction, as the unconstrained optimal 
risk capital was computed under the following key assumptions: 
 a) There are no unforeseen surges in volatility in the underlying assets, and  
b) There are no aggregate shocks in the banking system, which may cut off funding. 
In order to manage these risks, we set the risk limit to be less than the level implied by 
unconstrained optimal risk-capital. When the constraint is binding, we simply set 
2'' vxx =ρ and solve for the optimal risk level as follows. 
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(21) 
 
The individual risk-taking units maximize their expected returns (with the short 
option positions) subject to an overall risk limit imposed by the risk management 
philosophy of the fund. This risk limit is explicitly driven by the minimum level of 
unencumbered cash level that the firm must have under all circumstances as specified 
in equation (4). Note from (4) that the imposition of such a constraint on 
unencumbered cash translates to a natural constraint on leverage and risk capital. 
Such a limit will precipitate voluntary deleveraging activity, and will serve to increase 
the expected return of the fund over long horizon. 
 
Note that equation (20) captures in a succinct manner the effect of gates and funding 
environments. Recall from (4) that we may write unencumbered cash level as 
.1 zu λ−=  Hence, setting a risk limit on unencumbered cash level at u implies a 
limit on risk-capital itself. In other words, 
.1 zu λ−=  
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Substituting this into (20) we find the feedback effects of a risk management policy, 
which imposes a lower limit on unencumbered cash level as follows. 
.
ηϕ−−
= ezv  
We use this as an illustrative risk limit to motivate the optimization problem facing 
the hedge fund. Hedge funds differ in terms of their respective margin multipliers, and 
the parameters  ϕ and η which capture the uncertainties associated with investor 
redemptions and prime broker behaviour. To accomplish the same risk limit, hedge 
funds may have to impose different standards on the levels of unencumbered cash. 
For example, a fund in which investors have no redemption possibilities until t = 1, 
( )0 =ϕ the risk-capital can be higher in order to maintain the same level of 
unencumbered cash risk limit. On the other hand, if the fund has provided ample 
redemption provisions, then to keep the same level of unencumbered cash risk limit, it 
is necessary to lower the optimal level of risk-capital. These trade-offs are shown in 
Figure 9. Another point that is borne out by figure 9 is the following: funds which 
have worked out abundant funding facilities with their prime brokers may be able to 
maintain a higher risk-capital at every level of redemption frequencies. 
 
Figure 9 
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The first order conditions of optimality can now be derived from equation (18) as 
follows. The optimality condition corresponding to the choice of the risk-capital 
choice is shown next32. 
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(22) 
The shadow cost condition with respect to the variable λ is shown next. 
2' vxx =ρ  
(23) 
Combining (22) and (23) we get the expression for the shadow cost as follows. 
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(24) 
Given a risk limit, we need to solve (18) and (20) for the optimal levels of risk-capital 
and the shadow cost, given by ( )** ,λx .  
 
4.1 Shadow cost of risk-capital 
 
Consider a simple case in which the fund has two desks and the fund must decide on 
the risk-capital allocation problem. For simplicity we will suppose that the Sharpe 
ratios and the correlation coefficients are given as shown below. 
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Let us assume that the returns threshold (barrier) is set at -1.0%. The deleveraging 
costs are set at 2. For various risk limits on unencumbered cash level, how will the 
risk budget be allocated between these two risk-taking units? 
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 We denote by yg the partial derivative with respect to y, and by zg the partial derivative with 
respect to z.  
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In Table 2 below, we present the risk budgeting and how it is informed by the short 
option position held by the hedge fund. 
 
First, it is useful to recall from equation (20) that the risk limitν decreases as the fund 
sets a high level of minimum unencumbered cash level u as its risk management 
policy. Note also from Table 2 that when the risk limits are tight, the shadow costs as 
captured by λ are high, and at this low level of capital allocated, the short option is 
out of the money. This is reflected by the low cost of short option position. As we 
increase the risk capital, (either through high leverage, or ex-ante volatility, or both) 
maximum expected return achievable increases as the increase in short option value is 
more than offset by the increase in the expected return that would accrue to the fund, 
ignoring the short option. The unconstrained optimal risk-capital is 8.66 when the 
shadow costs go to zero.  
Table 2 
 
Risk capital Risk capital Total Expected Cost Net Lambda
to desk 1 to desk 2 risk capital Returns of short Expected Shadow 
LIMIT (no short options Returns Cost
options)
1.803 1.322 2.24 4.1593 0.8274 3.3319 0.1922
2.550 1.870 3.16 5.8822 1.9242 3.9580 0.0827
3.123 2.290 3.87 7.2042 2.9347 4.2695 0.0469
3.606 2.645 4.47 8.3187 3.8612 4.4575 0.0300
4.032 2.957 5.00 9.3005 4.7186 4.5819 0.0205
5.702 4.182 7.07 13.1529 8.3191 4.8338 0.0041
6.984 5.121 8.66 16.1090 11.2326 4.8764 0.0000
 
 
A fund which requires a high level of unencumbered cash limit will choose a very 
tight risk limit, and hence will lower the cost of the short option positions. In the 
process, it might end up giving up some upside potential. This is the trade-off that 
prudent risk management will have to evaluate. 
 
A feature of the risk budgeting in Table 2 is that the desk with the higher Sharpe ratio 
tends to get higher risk capital. A less obvious implication is that the ratio of the 
capital allocated to the desk with the high Sharpe ratio to the allocation for the other 
desk is always a constant. In the context of the example in Table 1 this constant is 
1.3636. This is irrespective of the aggregate risk limit. This implication follows from 
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our result in section 3 in equation (13). Note that the absolute level of risk budget 
allotted to each desk is a function of the de-levering costs as explained in section 3. 
 
What is the effect of correlations between trading desk on the level of risk capital and 
on its allocation across each desk? Table 3 provides some economic intuition behind 
the relationship between aggregate risk capital choice and correlation. Table 3 shows 
that as the correlation decreases, the optimal overall risk limit increases. This is 
intuitive. For the parameter values chosen, the optimal risk capital is around 13 for the 
case when the correlation is zero. For the case when the correlation is 0.4, the optimal 
risk limit is around 7. These results are sensitive to the high costs of de-levering. If we 
relax the risk limit imposed on the level of unencumbered cash levels, then the alpha 
will start to go down as excess risk capital gets allocated. 
Table 3 
Risk-capital rho =0 Risk-capital rho=0.4
10.00 8.692 3.16 4.228
10.49 8.745 4.47 4.975
10.95 8.785 5.48 5.262
11.40 8.814 6.32 5.370
11.83 8.834 7.07 5.388
12.25 8.847 7.75 5.357
12.65 8.854 8.37 5.294
13.04 8.855 8.94 5.212
13.42 8.852 9.49 5.117
13.78 8.846 10.00 5.012
14.14 8.836 10.49 4.901
14.49 8.823 10.95 4.786
14.83 8.808 11.40 4.668
 
What is the allocation of risk capital across the two desks as the correlation changes? 
Predictably, as the correlation increases, the desk with the higher Sharpe ratio tends to 
get the lion’s share of risk capital. When the correlation is zero, the desk with high 
Sharpe ratio gets 1.36 times the risk capital allotted to the other desk. As the 
correlation increases, this ratio begins to increase. Finally, when the two desks are 
perfectly correlated, the desk with lower Sharpe ratio gets negative risk capital – it is 
used to hedge the risk capital in the desk which has a higher Sharpe ratio. This 
implication of the model is intuitive: with high correlation, the desk with higher 
Sharpe ratio begins to strictly dominate the one with a lower Sharpe ratio.  
 
5. Implications for Investors and Policy Makers 
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Our analysis has some implications for hedge fund investors and policy makers. The 
extent to which due diligence is paid by hedge funds in managing their short option 
positions with investors and prime brokers should be of great interest to both hedge 
fund investors and policy makers. As we noted at the outset, these options should be 
fully understood by all parties ex-ante and vigorously managed, ex-post. Such a 
policy promotes transparency and helps to properly evaluate the economics of 
investing in hedge funds. From the investor’s perspective a careful evaluation of 
hedge fund’s risk management policy in the management of these short option 
positions is at least as important as understanding the fund’s investment philosophy, 
market risk and counterparty risk. Such an understanding can help make investors to 
make more informed decisions, and minimizes surprises ex-post. From a regulatory 
perspective, policy makers may benefit by focusing attention on these short option 
positions: in the event of a banking crisis, all prime brokers have tendency to 
withdraw their credit lines or increase significantly their margin requirements as we 
have documented. In some cases, prime brokers have been aggressive in exercising 
their funding options to terminate the hedge funds. In such a case, most hedge funds 
are obliged to de-lever simultaneously precipitating secular declines in asset prices. 
To the extent that hedge fund risk management policies already set prudent risk limits 
anticipating the potential exercise of short options, such de-leveraging is more likely 
to be planned and voluntary, as the funds would have allocated less risk-capital, ex-
ante. As a tool for hedge fund risk management, regulators may be better off focusing 
more on unencumbered cash levels to judge how well the funds are managing their 
risks, and how well they are placed to voluntarily de-lever. It is our view that this 
measure is much more transparent, relatively model-independent and easy to verify, 
unlike measures such as VaR, which are often dependent on models and assumptions.  
In policy discussion of gates, lockup periods and notification periods, it is useful to 
remember that these are usually agreed upon by investors, ex-ante in a transparent 
relationship between the fund and its investors. Regulators should make every effort 
to ensure that these contractual provisions are transparent to all investors. Their 
presence in the contractual agreements serves to mitigate systemic risk when large-
scale redemptions ensue due to unanticipated banking crisis or other macroeconomic 
developments. These provisions enable orderly and planned liquidations to meet the 
liquidity demands of exiting investors while protecting continuing investors and the 
fund to continue to function. There is presently no formal coordination mechanism for 
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orderly liquidations and workouts in the hedge fund industry that we are aware of. In 
the absence of a provisions such as “automatic stay” (which are part of chapter 11 
proceedings under the bankruptcy code) it is important that the hedge fund industry 
has well-articulated contractual provisions that enable the fund its prime brokers and 
its investors to have an orderly resolution of redemptions and settlement of claims in 
the event of distress. To the extent that contracts allow investors to redeem at different 
points in calendar time (investor-level gates as opposed to fund-level gates tend to 
accomplish this better) it may mitigate systemic effects of investor redemptions.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We make the observation that hedge funds, by construction of their funding 
arrangements and contractual arrangements with their investors are short in two very 
valuable options. We argue that these options introduce significant nonlinearities in 
their return generating process, quite independent of any portfolio strategies that the 
funds may choose to follow. In this sense, we depart from many of the papers in the 
hedge funds literature which focus on nonlinearities in hedge funds returns arising 
from portfolio strategies followed by hedge funds. An important consequence of these 
short options position is that there is typically a well defined leverage or optimal risk-
capital for hedge funds.  Our paper makes the argument that setting prudent risk limits 
on unencumbered cash allows the hedge fund to stay well within the prudent leverage 
levels without undue sacrifice in expected return. We show, through explicit examples, 
how to develop ex-ante leverage constraints through such risk limits. A contribution 
of our paper is the integration of contractual short option positions into the risk 
management principles for hedge funds. We also stress the important role played by 
unencumbered cash as a tool for risk management.  
 
The paper did not explicitly model the compensation structure of hedge fund 
managers to examine how they might interact with risk-taking behaviour and hence 
on prudent risk management structure. Aspects of compensation structure such as the 
management fee, performance fee, high water marks, etc. represent an important 
avenue for further research in hedge fund’s risk management. 
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